Vera Smith (1936) called Mountifort Longfield’s argument “by far the most important controversial point in the theory of free banking.” However, the modern literature on free banking scarcely mentions Longfield, despite his rediscovery or rehabilitation as an important economist and representative of the Irish subjective school (Moss, 1976; Tait, 1982; Rothbard, 1995).
Longfield’s argument turn on the effectiveness of interbank clearing in limiting overissue by any one bank. While the modern free-banking school (White, 1984; Selgin, 1988) sees an effective limit on overexpansion in the clearing mechanism (the principle of adverse clearings), as an expanding bank will lose reserves, Longfield (1971 [1840]) argued that this is not so. While the expanding bank will lose reserves as it expands, thereafter a new equilibrium will emerge in interbank clearing. The expanding bank will have a lower reserve ratio, but so will all banks, and the expanding bank will successfully have acquired a larger share of the market.
Longfield’s argument concerns a key proposition of the free banking school, namely that there is a sharp limit, in the form of the law of adverse clearings, to overexpansion by any one bank. If Longfield’s challenge succeed, then the free banking system falls, but this does not mean that we must accept Longfield’s own conclusion to the superiority of a monopoly of the note issue.
While the debates in the 19th century were concerned mainly with note-issuing banks, the principal point is the ability and effects of banks issuing unbacked money substitutes, whatever their form. Longfield’s argument will therefore be extended to the case of demand deposits. A free banking system is not safe from the problem of overexpansion, as it is in the interest of every bank to join the expansion once one bank increases its issues, whatever their form.